Israeli capitalism suffers defeat in
Lebanese war
Limits of Israeli military power
exposed
Kevin Simpson, CWI
The
barbarous 34-day assault on Lebanon
saw the deaths of at least 1,300 Lebanese, thousands injured, up to a million
people forced to flee their homes, and civilian infrastructure shattered. On
the Israeli side, 157 were killed, including 118 soldiers. But none of the
Israeli regime’s objectives were achieved. The war exposed the limits of Israel’s military power, and that of its
sponsor, US
imperialism. Hezbollah, on the other hand, has been strengthened politically.
This has provoked a crisis for Ehud Olmert’s
government. The ceasefire has brought fighting to a halt for the time being,
but the US-French brokered UN resolution will resolve none of the region’s
problems.
On
August 14, a United Nations-sponsored ceasefire in the latest Israeli-Lebanese
war came into effect. Sporadic clashes have continued. However, for the moment,
the Israeli regime’s murderous violence against Lebanon
has ceased and Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on northern Israel’s
civilian areas have halted. It is not clear how long this period of relative
quiet will last. For example, Israel
blatantly violated the ceasefire by attacking Hezbollah fighters in a village
deep in the Beka’a valley just six days after the UN
resolution was signed.
Rather
than improving the position of capitalism and imperialism in the Middle East, this war has vastly worsened the situation.
The proposals in the UN resolution, even if implemented, would solve none of
the underlying contradictions which led to the war. The deployment of the
Lebanese army in southern Lebanon
and the promise of a 15,000-strong multinational force are a face-saving way
out of the impasse, mainly devised to allow Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, to withdraw Israeli forces. Under present social
and economic conditions further conflicts will take place unless the Arab and
Israeli Jewish working class can find a route out of the periodic descent into
bloody wars which has been all that imperialism and capitalism have offered the
region since the end of the second world war.
What
has been dubbed the ‘sixth Israeli-Arab war’ will be recorded in the history
books as a major defeat for Israeli capitalism, its first on the field of
battle since the founding of the state in 1948. The Israeli regime had to
change its stated war aims half-way through the conflict, from “destroying”
Hezbollah to “weakening” Hezbollah. Israel
failed to gain the return of the two Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah on
12 July, the immediate pretext for Israel’s offensive. The Chief of
Army Staff was replaced during the war, and there were public divisions between
different parts of the military elite and within the cabinet over whether to go
ahead with a full land invasion in the 48 hours before the UN resolution came
into effect.
Reuven Pedatzur commented in the Israeli Ha’aretz
newspaper: “This is not a mere military defeat. This is a strategic failure
whose far-reaching implications are still not clear… In Damascus,
Gaza, Tehran and Cairo too, people are looking with amazement at the IDF
[Israel Defence Forces] that for more than a month could not bring a tiny
guerrilla organisation to its knees, the IDF that was defeated and paid a heavy
price in most of its battles in southern Lebanon… What happened to this
mighty army which after a month was not able to advance more than a few
kilometres into Lebanon?”
(16 August)
The
result of the war will also be recorded as a political victory for Hezbollah.
Paul Moorcraft, director of the Centre for Foreign
Policy Analysis, said: “Hezbollah has done a lot better than the conventional
forces of all the Arab states that have fought Israel since 1948. It has won a
stunning propaganda victory and shattered Israel’s defensive posture”.
(Guardian, 11 August) Hezbollah has become hugely popular across the Arab
world. A recent opinion poll in Egypt
found that Sayyad Hassan Nasrullah,
the general secretary of Hezbollah, is now the region’s most popular leader,
despite the fact that he is a Shia while the majority
of Arabs are Sunni.
The
result of the war is a setback for US
imperialism, Israeli capitalism’s main backer in the Middle
East. Undoubtedly, it also spells trouble for the corrupt and
spineless Arab elites who have bent the knee before the Israeli regime and the
capitalist west for decades.
Clearly,
the Middle East will become more unstable; US imperialism’s influence will be
undermined further; and the Arab regimes, already under siege because of the
anger of the Arab masses towards mass poverty and corruption, could face major
social upheavals.
What
is completely different about this war is that there is a clear understanding
internationally that the imperialist powers, particularly the Bush and Blair
administrations, rather than playing a moderating role on Israeli capitalism,
blatantly gave it full support and encouraged the war aims of the US’s client
state in the Middle East. The result will be even higher levels of anger
amongst the Arab and Muslim masses around the world and a further slipping in
the authority of the imperialist powers amongst the working class internationally.
The effects of this will echo through political developments regionally and
internationally over the next few years.
Collective punishment
From
the beginning it was clear that the military bombardment, rather than being an
attempt to destroy Hezbollah, was designed to crush an entire nation into
submission. The Israeli Air Force flew over 15,500 sorties against 7,000
targets while its navy fired more than 2,500 shells at Lebanon’s
coast. Lebanon’s
infrastructure has been devastated with over £2.5 billion worth of damage being
done. Schools, hospitals, power stations and even milk factories have been
destroyed. Over 1,300 Lebanese civilians were killed and tens of thousands more
injured. Lebanese journalists have commented that more damage was inflicted by Israel’s
month-long bombardment than the entire 20-year-long civil war.
Even
by the standards of Israeli capitalism, this was a particularly brutal war. The
Israeli regime committed war crimes in areas like Tyre
and Sidon. They
threatened to bomb any traffic moving on the roads and refused requests by the
UN and Red Crescent for safe transit for vehicles going to rescue civilians
dying in the rubble. Towards the end of the war, the Israeli regime,
increasingly desperate to achieve at least some of its war aims, dropped a
leaflet over Lebanon
which stated “each expansion of Hezbollah’s terrorist operations will lead to a
harsh and powerful response, which will not be confined to Hassan’s [Nasrullah] gang of criminals”.
If
ever a formal admission by the Israeli state was needed that it was involved in
the collective punishment of the Lebanese working class and rural poor, this
was it. What makes this even more monstrous is that US imperialism and the Blair
administration openly and cynically supported these tactics. Both refused to
call for an immediate ceasefire and instead rushed bunker busting bombs from
the US, via Prestwick
airport in Scotland, to Israel’s war
machine. In this context, Condoleezza Rice’s statement that the war represented
the “birth pangs of a new Middle East” is
seared into the minds of millions around the world, particularly the Arab
masses, as the pinnacle of imperialism’s barbarism in the modern era.
The
cessation of violence has, of course, brought some sort of relief to the
working class of Lebanon and
Israel.
But the war’s effects will be felt for generations to come. Hundreds of
thousands of mainly Lebanese families have had their lives shattered, through
the loss of loved ones but also in the destruction of homes occupied for generations;
the flattening of whole villages and towns; the destruction of the livelihoods
of millions of people; and a health and environmental disaster which modern
warfare with its depleted uranium tipped armaments always leaves in its wake.
Working-class
Israelis, both Jewish and Palestinian, have lost much too, although not on the
same scale. This was Israel’s
longest war since 1948 and also the first time that civilian areas have come
under sustained military attack since the founding of the state. Hezbollah
fired nearly 4,000 rockets, 250 on the last day of hostilities. Apart from the
Palestinian intifada this conflict saw the highest
number of civilian casualties in any conflict since 1948.
The
Israeli working class will bear the costs of the war through increased taxation
and cuts in living standards. The government estimates that the assault cost
$2.3 billion, but the newspaper, Yediot Aharonot (15 August), calculates that it will be upward of
$5.7 billion when the costs of war damage in Israel are taken into account.
Although not necessarily apparent now, the biggest blow for the Israeli ruling
class will be the further shattering of the idea that the Israeli state, with
the fourth strongest army in the world, can protect their security from outside
attack. This will have profound effects on the psychology of the Israeli Jewish
masses and therefore on social and political developments in Israel.
Above
all, what stands out is that the Israeli ruling class and US imperialism
completely failed to achieve any of their major war aims. Moreover, they have
no clear strategy for the next period.
‘The deterrence factor’ undermined
Undoubtedly,
the Israeli regime wanted to completely destroy Hezbollah. In part this was to
put to rest the ignominy of the IDF’s early
withdrawal from south Lebanon
in May 2000 as a result of Hezbollah’s guerrilla war against it. The Israeli
military elite also saw Hezbollah as perhaps one of the sharpest military
thorns in its side. Above all, the Israeli regime had a much broader aim in
mind in prosecuting this war. It was an attempt to reassert the military
superiority of Israeli capitalism across the region – in the jargon of the
military analysts, “to re-establish the ‘deterrence’ factor”.
Despite
the apparent differences on foreign policy between numerous Israeli
governments, in reality, the strategy of the Israeli ruling class has remained
fairly consistent since 1948. This has been the policy of the ‘Iron Wall’,
essentially, the creation of an overwhelming military force which is used
regularly to crush enemy opposition. It is only on the basis of the application
of this force that the Israeli regime is prepared to negotiate under conditions
where its adversaries are forced to accept whatever is on offer.
The
Israeli regime more recently has drawn the conclusion that despite the IDF’s brutal tactics in Gaza
and the West Bank (the Occupied
Territories), its image
as a powerful, regional military superpower has been undermined. This was
emphasised by the IDF withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000 and also by the
victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections in
January this year. The political and military setbacks of its main backer, US imperialism, in the Iraq quagmire,
also undermined the image of invincibility of the Israeli regime. Other
processes, such as the growing regional influence of Iran,
in part because of events in Iraq,
where parties with links to the Iranian regime now dominate the political
scene, have also added to this process.
It
was for these reasons that the Israeli military elite laid plans for a massive
show of firepower in Lebanon
at least two years ago. These were to be set in motion as soon as a pretext was
given by Hezbollah. This it did on 12 July with the cross-border incursion
which involved the taking prisoner of two soldiers and killing of three others.
In an article by George Monbiot, Gerald Steinberg, a
professor of political science at Bar-Ilan University
in Israel, commented: “Of all Israel’s wars since 1948, this was the one for
which Israel was most prepared… By 2004, the military campaign scheduled to
last about three weeks that we’re seeing now had already been blocked out and,
in the last year or two, it’s been simulated and rehearsed across the board”.
(Guardian, 8 August)
What
is more, US
imperialism was kept fully informed about these plans with a senior Israeli
army officer giving off-the-record presentations to US diplomats and others
from more than a year ago.
According
to some reports (including in the right-wing Jerusalem Post), Washington neo-cons
saw the war on Lebanon as an opportunity for an attack on Syria and even a
pre-emptive strike against Iran’s nuclear processing facilities. In reality,
however, the US is bogged
down in Iraq, while Iran’s
regional influence has been strengthened, making it unlikely that the Bush
regime, even if the war had continued, would have contemplated military attacks
on Syria or Iran. Instead,
the US is likely to push
harder for UN-authorised sanctions against Iran,
though even this is problematic given opposition from Russia and China,
and Iran’s threat to cut off
oil supplies from the Persian Gulf.
The
Olmert government’s plans lie in tatters, shattered
in the hills and valleys of south Lebanon. This is where the IDF came
up against ferocious resistance from Hezbollah fighters, despite a ferocious
‘shock and awe’ bombing campaign by its air force. Rather than re-establishing
the deterrence factor of the IDF, the military prowess of the Israeli regime
has been massively undermined. US, and to a lesser extent British, imperialism
have been exposed once again just as they have been by the failure of their
occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and by the Hamas
victory in the Palestinian elections. Once again, the Bush administration’s
campaign to ‘reshape’ the Middle East has been
shaken to the core.
The character of Hezbollah
An
important lesson which can be drawn from this conflict is that the outcome of
wars is determined by many factors, not just military ones. Social and political
factors can play just as much if not a more important role in determining the
result of any conflict.
This
is where the Israeli ruling and military elite made a fundamental error in
underestimating Hezbollah and its ability to resist the might of the IDF.
Undoubtedly, Israel’s
military tacticians looked to the bombing campaign of US imperialism at the
start of the Iraq
war as its model.
However,
the social and political conditions in Lebanon
were completely different from Iraq.
The conscripts of the Iraqi army, while not wishing foreign occupiers on their
soil, had no wish to sacrifice their lives for a dictator under whom they had
suffered for decades. This was one of the factors in paving the way for a
relatively easy dash to Baghdad by the US army.
In
contrast, even before the conflict started, Hezbollah had mass support in the
southern, mainly Shia, part of Lebanon where
the conflict took place. This arises from the history and development of this
organisation, whose leadership has been able at times to appeal to audiences
beyond its main Shia support base in the south and
the poor southern Beirut
suburbs. The evolution of Hezbollah shows that the national political
conditions that exist in Lebanon,
including the existence of 17 ethnic and religious groupings, have had an
important effect on its orientation and propaganda.
The
Shia population has always formed the most oppressed
section of Lebanese society. One of the first Shia-based
parties reflected this by calling itself the ‘Movement of the Dispossessed’. In
1974 when, as a result of government grants and outside investment, Beirut was flourishing (the ‘Switzerland of the East’), the
Lebanese Shia population (20% of the total at that
time) received only 0.7% of the government budget. As well as facing the worst
poverty and discrimination, the Shias also bore the
brunt of the Israeli occupation 1982-2000.
Hezbollah,
the ‘Party of God’, formed in 1982, was created as a reaction to the
occupation. It arose from the more combative rank-and-file members of the
secular Shia Amal movement
who believed their leadership had ceased to be an effective fighting force
against Israeli aggression. These members looked to what they saw as the
success of the Iranian revolution and were helped by members of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard to set up their new organisation. Hezbollah looked
ideologically to Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini in its
early years as an inspiration.
More
recently, however, Hezbollah has taken the complexion of a more populist
Islamist resistance organisation, with a strong nationalist tinge. The building
of a powerful militia force has been combined with the provision of social and
welfare services by its political wing. Some of its activists play a role in
the trade unions, the majority of which are divided along sectarian lines. In
the last few years it has become one of the strongest and most influential
political and military forces in Lebanon, more powerful than the
Lebanese army.
Like
all populist organisations it appeals to many different audiences through the
skilful use of radical demands and propaganda. Hezbollah does not hide its
Islamic roots, but has recently tried to appeal to a much wider audience,
mainly on the basis of Lebanese nationalism. Under Sheikh Hassan Nasrullah, the Hezbollah leadership dropped mention of its
earlier aim of transforming the country into an Islamic state. Over the years,
although often describing itself as the ‘Islamic resistance’ (which was taken
to mean a fighting resistance on the part of Shias
and Sunnis), it increasingly asserted that it was fighting for all Lebanese, be
they Christian, Druze, Shia or Sunni, against
aggression by the Israeli state. This was especially the case in the fight
against Israeli occupation which culminated in victory for Hezbollah when the
IDF were driven out of Lebanon.
Following this, Hezbollah entered ‘official’ politics and stood in elections,
winning 14 seats in parliament. In these elections it stood Christian
candidates on its lists. Earlier this year it formed a bloc in parliament with
the populist Christian leader Michel Aoun.
In
the latest war it once again referred to itself as the ‘Resistance’ as opposed
to the ‘Islamic Resistance’. Hezbollah leaders’ speeches stressed that this was
a nationalist struggle for the future of Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s
main base of support is undoubtedly among the Shia
rural poor and working class, but it has not based itself on a class-struggle
approach. Hezbollah has two ministers in the national unity government in Lebanon which
recently voted for the privatisation of electricity services. At the same time,
it helped organise a mass protest movement against the rise in electricity
prices in advance of privatisation. This shows the contradictory nature of
Hezbollah and the way in which its leadership attempts politically to face in
different directions.
Some
on the left internationally have compared Hezbollah to the African National
Congress, the national liberation organisation whose supporters fought against
the white apartheid regime in South
Africa. This is a false comparison to make.
It
is true that Hezbollah is fighting against US and Israeli domination of Lebanon and has
mass support among big sections of the population. Although the ANC had a
multi-class makeup, the specific weight and influence of the working class
played a much greater role within it. Socialist and revolutionary ideas were
discussed within the organisations ANC supporters built on the ground, and were
the basis on which the COSATU trade union federation was built. This
working-class base played a major role in defeating apartheid. The movement
against apartheid was a mass struggle by the working class for social,
political and economic change. The Freedom Charter, which was the political
manifesto of the ANC called for nationalisation of the mines and the banks. At
the height of the battle against apartheid in the townships, committees were
set up to decide through democratic discussion and debate how to take the
struggle forward. Unfortunately, because the ANC was not committed to a
rounded-out programme for the socialist transformation of society, the
leadership became more and more detached from the rank and file and
subsequently adopted blatant pro-capitalist policies.
Hezbollah,
however, does not deploy the methods of working-class struggle used by the ANC
in the period of mass struggle against the apartheid regime. While Hezbollah
has organised mass protests movements, this is an auxiliary tactic rather than
a way of encouraging the development of organised mass movements of the working
class and rural poor as a central aspect of the struggle. While they have
opposed some of the worst excesses of neo-liberal economic policies in Lebanon they
are not explicitly against capitalism. The problems of mass poverty, price rises
and cuts can only be ended through the overthrow of capitalism in Lebanon and the Middle East,
and the organisation of society along socialist lines. This is not the
political position of Hezbollah.
Only workers’ unity can show a way out of
war and poverty
Hezbollah has developed sophisticated
social welfare support particularly for the Shia
population in the poorest areas of Lebanon. It played the role which
the corrupt Lebanese elite failed to do in providing schools, hospitals and
employment. Today it is the second biggest employer in Lebanon, with
250,000 relying directly on it for jobs. There are numerous examples of how
families whose sole breadwinners have lost their jobs have had visits from
members of Hezbollah who have turned up unannounced to leave money or food
boxes. Families needing money for expensive operations for sick family members
have been given cards enabling them to go to any clinic in Lebanon for
treatment. Hezbollah leaders are renowned for not being corrupt and, too many Lebanese Shia especially,
appear to undertake political activity in the interests of the poorest sections
of society.
This activity was in marked contrast to
that of national politicians, renowned for their corruption and failure to do
anything for the poorest sections. One Lebanese commentator stated that
Hezbollah was a "state within a non-state". The tendency for
Hezbollah to build further support, particularly in Shia
areas which have borne the brunt of the latest Israeli attack, is likely to
continue given the way it responded to the post-war situation.
On the day after the ceasefire, Hezbollah
members were active in most of the main bombed areas, surveying the damage and
beginning to direct clearance and recovery of bodies trapped under rubble.
Hezbollah leaders immediately announced that each family whose house had been
destroyed would receive over $12,000 in the first year and Hezbollah would help
them rebuild their homes. It is likely that the finance necessary for this will
be provided by the Ahmadinejad regime in Iran, which
will further boost its position in the region.
In the struggle against Israeli occupation
in the 1980s, Hezbollah used its mass backing as a support base for its
military activity, melting into the villages once it had attacked IDF positions
or the client militia, the South Lebanese Army. The same tactics were used in
this war. Over the years Hezbollah built an extremely efficient, secretive and
underground guerrilla fighting force. In this conflict, on the few occasions
IDF units managed to capture Hezbollah positions they found air conditioned
bunkers with sophisticated computer guided missile systems. This shows that
Hezbollah used the lessons learnt by Iranian militias in the Iran-Iraq war.
Moreover, these discoveries show that Hezbollah undoubtedly received money and
armaments from Iran.
This made dramatic attacks such as the guided missile attack on the Israeli
naval destroyer possible. However, although this was a propaganda coup for
Hezbollah it was the tenacious campaign by its fighters on the ground that
caused the Israeli regime its major difficulties.
But western commentators are in the main
unable to really explain the main reason for its effectiveness as a fighting
force. Undoubtedly its fighters are well trained and extremely courageous. One
Israeli general commented during the recent fighting: "If you are waiting
for a white flag coming out of the Hezbollah bunker, I can assure you it won’t
come. They are extremists, they will go all the
way". (The Best Guerrilla Force in the World, Washington Post, 14 August) But the reason
for their courage and effectiveness is that all their fighters are fighting to
save their jobs, lands and houses and those of future generations. What is more
they have the support of the local population for their struggle.
This explains the huge difficulties that
the IDF ground war faced. Repeatedly, IDF officials claimed the capture of
towns like Bint Jbeil only to admit a few days later
that fighting was still going on. In the end, the IDF only could gain control
of these areas by bombing them to the ground.
Despite the hammer blows of the Israeli
regime, Hezbollah continued fighting. Outrage against the
Israeli attacks, rather than uniting the Lebanese population against Hezbollah,
led to the complete opposite. One opinion poll at the
height of the bombing put support for Hezbollah at 85% amongst the Christian
population. It was even higher amongst other sections.
However, while there is support for it
across the country, the main question is whether Hezbollah can break the cycle
of sectarianism that has been part of Lebanese politics and build
lasting active support across the community divide, and a membership amongst
all religious and ethnic groups? Despite its popularity, which at the moment
will probably continue to rise across Lebanon, this is unlikely to
happen. The Islamic slogans and phraseology that is still used by Hezbollah is
likely to cause fears and suspicion amongst members of non-Muslim communities
in Lebanon
that, in the last analysis, the organisation is only interested in defending
the rights of Shias.
It has to be recognised that, while
Hezbollah may gain broad popular support under certain conditions (as in the
current situation created by Israel’s
assault and the power vacuum in Lebanon),
in its ideology, popular base and external connections, it is essentially a
sectarian organisation. Under changed conditions of intensified sectarian
conflict in Lebanon
(between Shia, Christians, Sunnis, Druze, etc) it can
swing back to narrow Shia-sectarian policies. The
Hezbollah leadership will never escape these political limits on the basis of
policies that ultimately accept the rotten framework of capitalism. Only a
programme of socialist change, capable of uniting the working class and poor
across sectarian divisions, could provide a way out.
Workers’ unity & socialism
Under the conditions of poverty and want
which exist in the Middle East for the
majority of the population, and which are even more pronounced in the post-war
situation, the potential for a mass united struggle of the working class and
rural poor undoubtedly exists. But in order to realise this potential a
cross-community working-class party is needed, which has a political programme
and methods of uniting the poorest sections of the population. Such a party
could only achieve this unity by explaining the class basis of society and by
putting forward demands which deal with the common problems of the working
class and rural poor, be they Sunni, Shia, Christian
or Druze. Part of these demands would also be a recognition
of the democratic rights of all minorities and their right to practise the
religion they wanted to. But such a party could only maintain unity by going
beyond basic economic and democratic demands which deal with everyday problems.
It would have to explain that division and sectarian strife are part of the
capitalist system and a socialist society is necessary to overcome these
divisions once and for all.
In the absence of such a
socialist and mass workers’ party, other tendencies can develop in
society of division and conflict between the different ethnic and religious
sections of society, whipped up by reactionary forces. When they feel
confident, such forces will try to whip up propaganda against Hezbollah as the
‘party of the Shias’. Under conditions where
Hezbollah sees its popularity beginning to fall or where there are increasing
sectarian tensions in society, the leadership could bring its Shia Islamic ideology to the fore, thus leading to even
greater polarisation.
The movement against increases in
electricity prices gives an indication of what can happen. This movement was
undermined by right-wing parties blaming Hezbollah for the increases because it
was supposedly taking electricity out of the national grid illegally for Shias in the south of the country. Hezbollah will not be
able to fully answer these propaganda attacks to the satisfaction of the
members of non-Shia communities. These fears can only
be answered through building support for the ideas of workers’ unity and
socialism.
Socialist ideas will not be accepted
automatically by the masses and will have to be systematically built in Lebanon and across the Middle
East. This is especially the case given the immediate popularity
that Hezbollah has achieved. In fact, the ideas of guerrilla struggle against
imperialism will be given a big boost in the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America as a result of Hezbollah’s victory.
Undoubtedly, the IDF suffered a military
defeat at the hands of Hezbollah’s small guerrilla army. But can Hezbollah’s
tactics prevent future invasions of Lebanon by the Israeli regime? Can
they end the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza? Will they bring about a fundamental
change in the conditions of abject poverty the Arab masses are sinking further
into every day, for surely this is what the struggle against Israeli capitalism
and US
imperialism is all about?
In order to achieve these aims, the social
and economic conditions that lead to poverty and oppression need to be removed.
This means a struggle to overthrow Israeli capitalism and drive the
feudal-capitalist Arab elite out of power in the Middle
East.
Under certain conditions guerrilla struggle
can be an important auxiliary to the struggle against imperialist aggression
and exploitation. But on its own, this tactic cannot
succeed, for example, in overthrowing the Israeli capitalist state. Frustrating
an invasion by the IDF of Lebanon is one thing. Militarily destroying the
Israeli army in a lasting defeat is something quite different and beyond the
military capabilities of Hezbollah. But in order to end the possibility of
future invasions by the Israeli regime then the Israeli state machine has to be
defeated.
The only possibility is to undermine the
social base on which the Israeli state rests, as a first step to overthrowing
capitalism in Israel.
This means splitting away the Israeli Jewish working class (whom the state
relies upon to fight its wars) from the ruling class, and winning them to the
idea of overthrowing capitalism in the region. In order to do this the fears
that the Israeli Jewish workers have for their survival have to be answered. It
is for this reason that, while we fully supported the right of Hezbollah to
defend Lebanon
from invasion by the Israeli regime, we did not consider it correct to fire
rockets at Israeli civilian areas. This drove Israeli Jewish workers into the
arms of their ruling class, thus strengthening its position
The existence of an Israeli national
consciousness has to be recognised. However, we do not believe this should be
done at the expense of the rights of a Palestinian nation to exist. How will it
possible to accommodate the national rights of the Israeli nation, the
Palestinian masses and the Arab masses in general? This is not possible under
capitalism. Only by utilising the resources and wealth of the Middle
East in the interests of the majority, will it be possible to give
an answer to all the problems and fears faced by the Arab and Palestinian
masses and the Israeli Jewish working class. This could be achieved through the
struggle for a socialist confederation of the Middle East in which a socialist Palestine exists alongside a socialist Israel.
Hezbollah’s victory will not only mean a
rise in support for the ideas of guerrilla struggle. Given the brutal
application of neo-liberal economic policies and US imperialism’s military
intervention in the region, an explosive mix exists. Up to now one factor that
partially held back social upheavals amongst the Arab masses was the feeling of
powerlessness, an inability to stand up to the oppressive dictatorial regimes
across the Middle East. However, the defeat of the IDF has raised confidence to
its highest level in decades and exposed the weakness of the majority of Arab
leaders. Under conditions like this, nervous regimes which attempt to crush any
opposition could find that, unlike on previous occasions, such methods are a
spark for massive social protests.
In Iraq,
the insurgency is likely to become bolder as a result of the difficulties of US
imperialism’s main regional ally. Shia groups, such
as the forces around Moqtada al-Sadr
and even Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, will
possibly adopt a more strident anti-US position.
The Ahmadinejad
regime will feel more confident of demanding further concessions from the EU
powers and US imperialism
over the offer they have made to try to persuade Iran to stop its attempts at
producing weapons’ grade uranium. In fact, the Iranian regime, which has just
carried out extensive war games in the Baluchi area
of the country as a ‘warning to its enemies’, may even go as far as carrying
out its threat to reject the package put forward by the EU completely. This
would once again lead to a rapid sharpening of tensions in the region and would
pose a major headache for US
imperialism.
Israeli political crisis
However, it is in Israel that the
most immediate and sharpest changes in consciousness and developments could be
seen. The result of the war will see a growth in political instability and
fears for the future amongst wider sections of the population. The Kadima government has entered a period of crisis. It is not
guaranteed that Olmert and Amir
Peretz, the defence minister, will even keep their
jobs. Support for Olmert has gone down from 78% to
40%.
Peretz languishes
at 28% support, a complete turnaround from the position which he had when he
was first elected leader of the Labour Party in November 2005. Many
working-class Israelis regarded him as breaking the mould of Israeli politics
because he was the first Labour leader to come from a poor working-class
background and spoke their language. Peretz initially
put forward radical demands like a doubling in the minimum wage and for a
state-run pension system. During the general election campaign he dumped most
of these policies and, just a few months later, has ended up as one of Israel’s most
unpopular politicians ostensibly in charge of one of the most disastrous
military campaigns in the country’s history.
Kadima was the
creation of the former prime minister, Ariel Sharon,
and contains many of the old dinosaurs of Israeli politics from the two main
traditional parties, Likud and Labour. It has no
clear ideology or programme apart from the commitment to a unilateral
withdrawal from parts of the West Bank and the
declaration of final borders of a Palestinian state. With the crisis in
confidence in the government, Olmert has had to
announce the shelving of this plan, the main promise his party made in the
election campaign.
One process in Israeli society emphasised
by the war is the undermining of the institutions of capitalist rule,
particularly the way in which the army is viewed. This would have important
implications in any country but in Israel, whose army has had mythical
status in what is essentially a capitalist warrior state, these are even more
serious. On top of this is a further undermining of the already low standing of
the political elite.
Despite the huge initial public support
amongst Israeli Jews for the war, particularly after Hezbollah rockets started
falling on civilian areas, the perception developed that the politicians and
generals had no clear aims and were continually surprised by developments
during the fighting. A commentator in Ha’aretz,
dealing with Olmert’s future, wrote: "You cannot
lead an entire nation to war promising victory, produce humiliating defeat and
remain in power. You cannot bury 120 Israelis in cemeteries, keep a million
Israelis in shelters for a month, wear down deterrent power, bring the next war
very close and then say – oops, I made a mistake. This was not the intention.
Pass me a cigar please". (15 August)
An indication of the problems that will
come the way of the ruling class is the huge scandal which broke out
immediately after the ceasefire, centring on the Chief of Army Staff, General Halutz. It was revealed that in the three hours following
the initial attack by Hezbollah, before Halutz
ordered the implementation of the military campaign, he contacted the manager
of his $15,000-share portfolio and instructed him to immediately sell – a new
version of insider dealing! There is outrage that, while a war was being
prepared which was portrayed as one for the ‘survival of Israel’, its
top general was preoccupied with his personal wealth! This is especially so
given the complaints that surfaced at the end of the war from mobilised
reservists about the lack of equipment, supplies (including water!) and the
total chaos which the generals presided over. These criticisms are particularly
important since all adults in Israel
below retirement age are, in effect, reservists.
In the absence of a genuine workers’ party
which could channel this anger electorally, it is
likely, given peoples’ fear for their security, that the standing of right-wing
politicians like Netanyahu could rise once again. A more right-wing coalition
government cannot even be ruled out in the future. However, even if this
perspective is borne out, this does not mean social peace in Israeli society.
There is likely to be a re-emergence of fierce class battles as workers are
forced to pay the costs of this conflict. Among more conscious sections of the
population, particularly among young people, a new radicalisation will develop.
This will result in increased interest in the socialist and revolutionary ideas
put forward by Maavak Sotzialisti,
the CWI’s affiliated organisation in Israel.
Volatile situation
The fact that the Israeli military elite
suffered a defeat opens up a new and possibly dangerous situation in Middle
Eastern politics in the medium term. While it would seem logical that the
Israeli regime should hold back from further military action, the ruling class
will want to repair the damage done to its image and may attempt more military
adventures.
The Israeli regime is likely to take a much
harder line in the West Bank and Gaza.
Even before the end of the war, the IDF was increasing its repressive measures
in Gaza, partially hidden from world view by the
war in Lebanon.
Up to 151 people were killed in the Gaza
strip in July, the highest level for two years. A UN report said that 70% of
the population were reliant for their survival on outside food aid. It is clear
that this is the result of the IDF attacks on Gaza over the last few months.
A further contributing factor to
instability is the ceasefire itself. There are many issues unanswered by the
UN-brokered ceasefire. It is not even certain that it will hold. The agreement
calls for 15,000 Lebanese troops to be deployed in south Lebanon and a similar number of UN troops to act
as a buffer between Israel
and Lebanon.
The implication of the resolution is that
the Lebanese army should be responsible for the policing of Hezbollah. If this
responsibility had been given to the UN forces this would have very rapidly led
to clashes with what would have been seen as a new foreign occupation force
acting in the interests of the Israeli regime, camouflaged in the blue helmets
of the UN.
But it is ruled out that the Lebanese army
will attempt to forcibly disarm Hezbollah. Under present conditions soldiers
would refuse to obey orders and would probably go over to the side of Hezbollah.
There has clearly been an interim agreement between the Lebanese government and
Hezbollah leaders that Hezbollah fighters will store their weapons and rockets
but will not disarm.
This has been openly acknowledged by
Lebanese leaders and some UN officials, even while US
and Israeli leaders have been asserting that the role of the Lebanese army and
the multinational force is to disarm Hezbollah. "The role of this
[UN-sponsored multinational] force", announced UN deputy general
secretary, Mark Malloch Brown, "is no
large-scale disarmament of Hezbollah but rather policing a political
agreement". (International Herald Tribune, 19 August) The ‘political
agreement’ is really a charade designed to allow Israel a way out.
"It’s not a search-and-seizure
operation", stated the Lebanese premier, Fouad Siniora, referring to the deployment of the Lebanese army
in the south. "The army would not ask militants to relinquish their
weapons", confirmed Lebanon’s
defence minister, Elias Murr (International Herald
Tribune, 16 August). "The reality", commented the International
Herald Tribune (18 August), "is a kind of murky deal in which Hezbollah
takes its weapons off the streets and the army does not look too hard, if at
all, for them".
France, which had initially
indicated it would play the major role within the UN force, has only committed
200 soldiers so far! This is because the French ruling class realises that a UN
force could end up being seen as occupiers and suffer big casualties. This is
why France
and other countries have asked for clearer rules of engagement – at the moment
they are not happy with the fact that they can only retaliate militarily if
they are attacked. A number of countries have also expressed concerns about the
unclear chain of command in the UN force.
The UN force has been given the
responsibility to stop the transit of weapons into southern Lebanon from Syria and further afield. However, it is likely that if it implements this
proposal forcibly, clashes with Hezbollah will develop. At the moment, the UN
agreement is in danger of being completely compromised by the failure of
different countries to provide soldiers.
This is why some Israeli commentators have
claimed that the recent conflict was a precursor for the ‘next war’. Alain Gresh wrote: "Not since 1967 has the Middle
East suffered so many simultaneous high-intensity crises. Though
each has its own rationale, they are linked by many threads, making partial
solutions more difficult and dragging the region even faster into the
abyss". (Le Monde Diplomatique,
August 2006)
The latest war in the Middle
East demonstrates the incapability of capitalism and imperialism
to solve any of the growing problems of the region. The devastation in Lebanon gives a
concrete reminder of the necessity to build a movement across the region for a
struggle for socialism and a socialist confederation of Middle Eastern states
to begin to repair the damage done over decades by imperialism and their
supporters.
·
All
foreign troops out of Lebanon
·
For the
defence of the national and religious rights of all minorities
·
For a
socialist confederation of the Middle East with a socialist Lebanon, a socialist Israel
and a socialist Palestine